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New Governance and Rights-Claims 
Vlad Perju∗
Introduction 
I. Ideas as catalysts: Rights and the struggle for recognition of persons with disabilities
II. Strategic and communicative components of rights-claims
III. Two conceptions of responsiveness: An excursus into constitutional theory 
Conclusion: The not-so-strange alchemy of new governance and “old government” 
Introduction:
No school of thought has done more than new governance to advance our thinking about 
the nature, role and possibilities of political and legal institutions under the conditions of 
late modernity. Yet rarely does new governance theorize these institutions within the 
broader form of government --- constitutional democracy --- whose power they structure 
and channel. This uneasiness to combine new governance and “old government” is 
unjustified. If anything, the core insights of new governance should shine brighter when 
placed within a tradition of political thought that revolves around questions of 
justification, freedom and self-government. Whatever normative pressure that tradition 
may apply on the new governance canon will deepen the understanding of our 
commitment to live politically in a free community of equals.  
 Flexibility, transparency, experimentation, participation, access, accountability, 
catalysis - this is the conceptual landscape of new governance as it encounters the 
universe of traditional liberal thought: coercion, courts, justification, violence, freedom, 
self-respect, rights, (normative) individualism. That initial encounter is the terrain of this 
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2paper. Its claims can be listed as follows: not only institutions, but also ideas, can act as 
catalysts; one such powerful idea is that of enforceable rights; rights-claims combine 
strategic and communicative elements, and the latter remain obscured unless one 
approaches the social phenomena that rights can destabilize from the standpoint of the 
interested right-holder; courts have duties of responsiveness towards claimants (present 
and future), including a duty  to anticipate and counteract distortions in the claimants’ 
formulations of their own interests; a responsive conception of democracy need not 
necessarily be procedural. 
 My argument proceeds in three steps. Section 1 introduces disability rights as the 
example that  grounds the subsequent theoretical analysis. This section dwells specifically 
on central features of legal reforms in the US and the EU under the influence of the social 
model of disability. Section 2 seeks to explain a puzzle identified in the first section, 
namely the remarkable staying power of rights-based social advocacy  in the face of 
disillusionment with courts. The explanation offers a glimpse at the combination of 
strategic and non-strategic, or communicative, elements in rights-claims. Section 3 takes 
these lessons into the terrain of constitutional theory. It contrasts a conception of 
responsiveness as derived from the canon of new governance with an alternative but 
related conception that assumes more openly its normative affinity with constitutional 
democracy.   
§1. Ideas as catalysts: Rights and the struggle for recognition of persons with 
disabilities
One of new governance’s main contributions to the understanding of modern regulatory 
regimes, and of modern law more generally, has been its emphasis on the role of 
institutions such as courts as catalysts.2 However, that institutional focus must not be used 
to downplay the importance of ideas in politics and law. In this section I use the example 
of disability reform to show how the social model of disability and the related idea of 
rights have served as catalysts for the actions of social movements and institutional 
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3reform. 
The “charity” model is the starting point for any history of disability  reform. According 
to this model, persons with disabilities were perceived as somehow deficient and 
therefore in need of “rehabilitation,” though not entitled to it. The charity model of social 
policy was rooted in a medical understanding of disability that understood disability  as 
caused by  functional incapacities rooted in an individual’s medical condition and/or 
impairment. This combination - charity model grafted onto a medicalized approach - 
created and reinforced specific understandings, including self-understandings, of social 
groups: society thus appeared divided between the passive beneficiaries of 
“rehabilitation” policies and the “able”, hopefully charitable citizens. Such a division 
bred an inevitable and unmistakable paternalism that informed the policies of national 
governments as agents of rehabilitative action. 3  The social model reversed this dynamic. 
It reoriented the understanding of disability away from the individual’s functional 
incapacity and towards society’s reaction to that incapacity. For instance, advocates of the 
social model argued that  inability to walk is not a disability; what makes it a disability  is 
the lack of wheelchair-accessible buildings. The social model turned persons with 
disabilities from passive “objects of rehabilitation and cure” into active citizens entitled 
to make demands on social institutions. 
Tracing the trajectory of the social model, and generally of the struggle for equality  of 
persons with disability, requires a comparative, mainly a transatlantic, approach. 4  That 
story is intricate and it helps to have a heuristic device to help  one follow the social 
model across different jurisdictions. Social systems theory can serve as that device. 
According to (an adaptation) of social systems theory, one can think of legal systems 
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4functioning like cells in that they translate into their unique “code” the “information” 
they  receive from the outside environment. If the main insight of the social model, 
namely that  disability is society’s reaction to an individual, is the information entering 
from the outside, then the story starts when the model traveled from the UK to the U.S. 
where, under the influence of a rights-centered legal and political discourse, it was 
translated into antidiscrimination code in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.5 
As this code became engrained in American law, national and transnational social 
movements became the actors of learning and cross-jurisdictional acculturation. Even 
before the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, developments in 
American disability policy proved very influential in Europe at the hands of the disability 
activists. There are many accounts of European advocates regularly traveled to the US, 
starting from the early 1970’s. At a time when the European domestic disability regimes 
were still deeply steeped in the charity-based model, the rights-based American legal 
reforms expanded the legal imaginary of disability advocates in Europe. Interestingly, it 
was American law, rather than the rhetoric or discourse of the American social 
movement, that proved most influential at the early stages of transatlantic influence. The 
explanation is that, in the US, the expansion of the Rehabilitation Act to cover 
discrimination on the basis of disability was not a response to societal pressure but rather 
the outcome of “anticipatory  politics.”6  Specifically, the reforms reflected the views of 
government insiders —in particular Congressional staffers—who came to see persons 
with disabilities as a minority group engaged in a struggle for recognition comparable to 
that of the civil rights and the women’s movements. While the American disability rights 
movement later borrowed from the rhetoric of the other struggles for recognition7, in the 
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5early 1970’s “the social movement was in the government.”8 By the time the Americans 
with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1990, an influential social movement had developed 
outside the government. Even so, the movement and the government provided to the 
European observers a united front – “unlike other major pieces of civil rights legislation 
enacted by Congress because there was no serious opposition to the ADA.”9
 The roles of official as well as non-official players make it  a complex task to trace the 
social model’s transatlantic influence. Turning the attention to Europe only compounds 
that complexity. Largely unsuccessful at the national level at  a time when domestic policy 
was steeped in the charity models, European disability advocates used the American 
rights-based, antidiscrimination regulations to lobby EU institutions, especially the 
Commission but also the European Parliament, for similar legislation. Their rights-
centered lobbying efforts were highly successful. There was no difficulty in convincing 
the Commission because its political interests in portraying European integration along a 
social, and not  only an economic, axis perfectly  aligned with the interests of the disability 
advocates. Moreover, rights-based social reforms also strengthened the Commission’s 
effort to expand the powers of the Community vis-à-vis the member states. It also didn’t 
hurt that reliable channels were available for advocacy for legislation based on the social 
model. Specifically, the main voice for the persons with disabilities was the European 
Disability Forum (EDF), an umbrella organization at the Community level that played a 
central role in the acculturation of the social model in Europe. Following a broader patter 
of Commission involvement with the social movements, the EDF had been established 
with funds from the European Commission, which retained considerable influence over 
its political choreography. 
 The main obstacle for enacting American-inspired legal reforms was legal, not 
political. At the time, the limited powers of the Community did not include a legal basis 
to enact antidiscrimination legislation on grounds of disability. As soon as that obstacle 
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6was lifted, in Art 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community  proceeded without 
delay to enact secondary anti-discrimination legislation. Framework Directive 2000/78 
prohibited employment discrimination on ground of disability, inter alia, and imposed on 
employers a duty  to provide reasonable accommodation for disabled employees. The duty 
was transplanted copy/paste style from the ADA, which unsurprisingly provided the 
inspiration for the EU legislation. Indeed, so central has the ADA been in expanding the 
horizon of possibilities of disability advocates in Europe and beyond that observers have 
quipped that the Act has been more influential abroad than at home.10
 In what follows I point out a few elements in this comparative history of disability 
reform that can help us think through the complex relationship between new governance 
and right-claims.11 
 Central to the new governance narrative is an emphasis on soft law as a cure for top-
down, all-or-nothing legal rules backed by hard sanctions. Soft  law measures are tools 
that allow stakeholders to negotiate and internalize norms of conduct  or action so as these 
norms have long-term effects. Because the effects are not produced by  fear of sanctions, 
but rather by  flexible and self-referential frameworks, norms of soft law allow 
participants to gain a better understanding of their interests and capabilities and thus 
adjust their actions in the direction specified by  the norm. The open method of 
coordination, benchmarks and peer review are part of the typical arsenal of soft law. In 
the area of disability  policy, the Community deployed these methods starting in the 
1970’s and with increased frequency over the following decades. Some of those measures 
aimed, and succeeded, in creating a common institutional framework in which national 
officials in charge of disability  policies could exchange information and learn from each 
other’s experiences. But the fact is that  overall the framework had very limited success in 
delivering the kind of change the stakeholders sought. Collecting information was 
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experimentalist interpretation of the requirement of “reasonableness” in the duty of employers to provide 
reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities)
7insufficient to bring about a policy shift to the social model. The use of soft law did little 
to challenge the medical model that informed the social policy of the Member States. Soft 
law measures were also insufficient in “socializing” states into opening up their disability 
policies to the Community’s outside scrutiny with bite.  National governments proved 
willing to join in the Community’s information exchange networks as long as the costs of 
participation were low to nonexistent. But as soon as the Community tried to “harden” its 
soft measures, either by enabling its institutions to follow through with the national 
implementation of goals in areas such as employment or by  seeking to enact secondary 
legislation in areas such as transportation of persons with disabilities, Member States 
quickly exercised their veto powers. As one commentator summed it up, the overall 
impact of disability-specific initiatives was “minimal.”12 
 Before Amsterdam, soft law measures were the only  tool available to the Community 
lacking the legal basis for “hard” legal measures in this area. Yet disability advocates, 
through the EDF, argued that only changes in the Community competencies could allow 
for structural change along the lines of the social model through enforceable rules. Some 
scholars have recently  used this example to make a sweeping case against soft law. For 
instance, Daniel Kelemen has relied on past lack of satisfaction with soft law, such as the 
OMC, to predict that “in core areas of EU competence, … new modes of governance will 
remain of little significance. They will be overshadowed by the persistent tendency of the 
EU to rely  on judicial enforcement of strict legal norms.”13 This is a powerful argument 
but not entirely convincing. The study of disability reform teaches that the logic of hard 
vs. soft law is not a binary  either/or logic. Soft law has remained in effect, and new soft 
law measures were enacted, after the coming into force of Art 13 Amsterdam and even 
the enactment of the Framework Directive. Indeed, the effectiveness of soft law measures 
increased once they were no longer self-standing but rather became parasitic upon hard 
law. It is no paradox that the case for soft law measures is stronger within a framework 
delineated by hard laws. 
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8 A second aspect of disability  reform concerns the form of the hard legal norms. Both 
disability  advocates and Community  political actors argued for the enactment of 
individual rights. This idea of rights— enforceable rights—played a key role in the 
transformation of disability  policy. That rights should have a prominent role was 
somewhat unsurprising in the context of American disability reforms, given the history of 
the modern struggles for recognition in the US. The interesting question is thus less why 
the American experience has been “an exporter of rights consciousness”14 but rather why 
the export has been so successful in this context. As we have seen, from the late 1960s 
through the 1990s, the American antidiscrimination regime framed the horizon of the 
legal imagination of disability advocates from across Europe. Why? 
 The question about the influence or a rights-centered discourse answers itself once 
one sees that the importance of rights transcends their strategic use. The choice of rights 
as tools is normatively  continuous with the tenets of the social model. The medicalized 
approach had failed “to take into account wider aspects of disability,”15  such as the 
experiences of disabled persons. An emphasis on rights changed the social status and 
social understanding of persons with disabilities from powerless recipients of their peers’ 
charity to right-holders capable of making demands on the world.16  When European 
disability  advocates drew inspiration from the successes of their American counterparts, 
they  unfailingly noted, more than anything else, the empowerment effect of using rights 
as swords or shields when confronting the prejudice embedded in social customs. In both 
(self-) perception and reality, rights promised to transform their holders from “objects of 
pity” into citizens ready to challenge the structure and dynamic of social spaces. 
   The empowerment connection between rights and the social model explains, at  least 
in part, why the disability  movement supported both the ADA and the EU framework as 
enforceable exclusively through private litigation, rather than through an equality 
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9institution such as an agency.17  The exclusivity of enforcement through litigation sets 
disability apart from other antidiscrimination regimes, such as race or gender 
discrimination, and indeed a peculiarity  that might change under the obligations assumed 
by the EU and the US as signatories to the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.18  In the EU, supranational political institutions proved responsive to the 
demand for enforceable rights. The Commission organized training seminars for 
disability  advocates across Europe on how to litigate the implementation of the 
Framework directive in their respective national legal systems. It is still too soon to gauge 
the implementation and social effect of this strategy of enforcement through litigation. 
Moreover, one must also recall that the Framework Directive covers exclusively the area 
of employment and occupation. Calls for a more comprehensive antidiscrimination 
directive have thus far been unheeded - one of the few instances of friction between the 
EDF and the Commission. Yet no proposal or evaluation of the current state of legal 
affairs have questioned the centrality of the enforceable rights as the form for hard law in 
the area of disability discrimination.
 
 The steadfast commitment to enforceable rights is all the more noteworthy  given a 
significant and quite unexpected difficulty in the implementation of the social model of 
disability. Neither primary  nor secondary Community legislation defines the meaning of 
disability. The definition made the object of the first preliminary reference to the Court  of 
Justice on the interpretation of the Framework directive. In the case of Sonia Chacon 
Navas, the Court was asked if the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of 
disability  in the Framework Directive extended to protect  an employee who had been 
fired because of illness. Since the text of the directive itself provides no direction, the 
Court had to decide if discrimination on the basis of illness qualifies as disability 
discrimination. It  was not difficult to anticipate that the question of the definition of 
disability  would come up, and that, when it  did, the Court of Justice would give itself the 
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10
task of wording an autonomous Community  definition, for fear that definitional 
differences across national jurisdictions would undermine the effectiveness of the 
Directive. Moreover, the American experience should have flagged the dangers involved 
in defining disability. While the ADA does include a definition of disability (which has 
remained unchanged since the Rehabilitation Act and through the 2008 Amendments to 
the ADA19), American courts narrowed access to the benefits granted by  Congress by 
limiting the application of the statute ratione personae. Similarly, the ECJ too opted for a 
narrow, medicalized approach that defines disability  as the functional limitation deriving 
from a medical impairment rather than the societal response to the impairment. 
Specifically, the court defined disability  as “a limitation which results in particular from 
physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the 
person concerned in professional life.” Such an approach to the definition of disability 
disregarded the rich history  of struggle for recognition of persons with disabilities. As one 
scholar points out, “For over a hundred years, disability has been defined in 
predominantly medical terms as a chronic functional incapacity whose consequence was 
functional limitations assumed to result from physical or mental impairment.”20 Despite 
clear legislative indication to implement the social model, the Court  of Justice 
nevertheless opted for a medicalized approach. 
 Before studying what led the court in that direction, it should be noted that  decisions 
such as the Court’s narrow definition of disability  are the basis for new governance’s 
judicial skepticism. In the European context, the narrow judicial definition set the clock 
back to before 1996 when the Commission formally  endorsed the social model as the 
guiding principle for disability reform in the EU.21  In the American legal system, 
however forward-looking the intent of Congress might have been in enacting the ADA, 
courts limited access to many  of its intended beneficiaries. As one commentator of the 
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20 Richard Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act at 214 (2000)
21 See the 1996 Communication from the Commission.
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American scene noted by reference to the ADA’s reference to 40 million disabled 
Americans, it  was very  surprising how few of those Americans were among the plaintiffs 
who brought cases under the statute. 
 And yet, a curious fact has been the reaction of stakeholders, including most 
prominently  the disability rights movement, to these judicial decisions that threatened to 
undo the legislative progress. These judicial actions did not change the strategy of the 
movement away from courts or/and back to regulation exclusively through soft law. To 
the contrary, advocates argued in the opposite direction - for ever more specific and clear 
rules – including rules defining disability that would limit the leeway  of courts in 
imposing sanctions on employers found to have violated their duties.22  Why? What 
explains the resilience of enforceable rights? Why  did stakeholders continue to insist on 
rights, even in the face of obvious disappointment? 
§2. Strategic and communicative components of rights-claims
Before turning to these questions, it helps to ask something a more fundamental 
methodological question: why does it matter why the stakeholders continued to insist on 
enforceable rights? Asking about motivations assumes that motivations can illuminate 
legal phenomena. In this case, for instance, it assumes that the internal perspective of the 
stakeholders helps to understand the forces shaping disability regulation. But why attach 
the meaning of a phenomenon to the experience of the actors engaged in it? It is a 
venerable tradition in social thought, going from Marxism to social systems theory, that 
argues forcefully that the two must be decoupled. According to that approach, the 
meaning of a social phenomenon must be derived from objective social facts rather than 
from subjective states of mind. While states of mind might be important for 
understanding the actors, they are irrelevant for elucidating the phenomenon itself. Happy 
slaves are still slaves. 
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The canon of new governance shares a natural affinity  to this objectivist, as opposed to a 
normativist, social theoretical approach. Exactly how it does it, and whether by so doing 
it can withstand jurisprudential scrutiny, are questions that I only introduce here and to 
which I will return, albeit indirectly, in the next section. For now it helps to keep in mind 
the distinction between objective and subjective approaches in social theory and offer the 
conjecture that the meaning of a specifically  social phenomenon, including legal 
phenomena, will likely require a combination of external and internal accounts.23 Roberto 
Unger helpfully states this methodological imperative in Law in Modern Society: “(t)he 
sense individuals attribute to one another’s acts is what gives their conduct its distinctly 
social or human meaning. To disregard this meaning is to neglect an integral part of the 
experience for which an account is to be given… If we disregard the meanings an act has 
for its author and for the other members of the society to which he belongs, we run the 
risk of losing sight of what is peculiarly  social in the conduct we are trying to understand. 
If, however, we insist on sticking close to the reflective understanding of the agent or his 
fellows, we are deprived of a standard by which to distinguish insight from illusion or to 
rise above the self-images of different ages and societies, through comparison. Thus, 
subjective and objective meaning must somehow both be taken into account.”24 
Searching for an explanation that combines subjective and objective meanings, I argue 
below that the resilience of enforceable rights in the disability context is a mechanism of 
empowerment and self-respect whose effectiveness the claimants themselves have eroded 
by misunderstanding the role and possibilities of courts. Using as an example the case of 
the definition of disability, I argue that the social movement has deployed a strategy that 
ended up  distorting its legal claims and ultimately  undermining its struggle for 
recognition. However, I also suggest that the courts themselves should have anticipated 
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and counteracted the self-inflicted distortion effects of societal stakeholders.   
Our initial question was: What explains the resilience of courts and enforceable rights in 
the discourse of the disability  rights movement even after disillusionment with the 
judiciary’s narrow interpretation of disability  statutes? Answering this question will be 
easier after asking a prior question - why did courts, in both the US & EU, interpret social 
model disability legislation narrowly, along the lines of the medicalized approach that the 
social model was meant to replace?
The voluminous literature on the causes of the judicial backlash in the US offers a 
number of possible answers to this latter question, some of which have equivalents in the 
European context. I cannot dwell on this literature here – I have done it elsewhere25 - so I 
will only briefly  mention among (related) causes interpretative-textualist accounts, 
jurisprudential explanations placing disability  discrimination within the larger context of 
the jurisprudence of equality; ideological factors pointing to the conservatism of the 
judiciary  and interwoven market and social factors in the discourse of disability reform.26 
In my view, these factors are insufficient to explain the resilience of the medicalized 
approach in judicial decisions. They fail to give ideas their due, especially to the insights 
of the social model. In what follows, I explain the staying power of the medicalized 
approach through the interplay  between, on the one hand, its conceptualization of illness, 
impairment, and disability within the social model and, on the other hand, the broader 
argumentative strategies that the disability  rights movement deployed in its struggle for 
recognition of the equal status of persons with disabilities. 
It is difficult to disentangle the substance of the model’s main claims from the 
argumentative strategies used to advocate for disability  reform both in Europe and in the 
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United States. While the story points to the central role of courts, that prominence was the 
result of a certain understanding on the part of the social movement and theorists of the 
social model about the role that courts can play. Their distrust for courts led these actors 
to over-(and mis-) strategize, ultimately distorting its claims by diluting their 
communicative dimensions. 
Consider first the failure to theorize the concept of medical impairments. This concept is 
central to the legal definition of disability, whether the source of the definition is 
legislative or judiciary. The failure to provide an account of medical impairments left 
judges bereft of guidance on how to interpret disability according to the social model and 
made them seek refuge in the more familiar territory  of the medicalized approach. 
Important for our purpose is that the decision to leave medical impairments under-
theorized was not an accident, but rather the result of strategy: the movement believed 
that theorizing impairments would make it harder to sever the disability  from illness or 
disease, thus making it difficult to move away  from the medicalized and towards the 
social model of disability. Failure to theorize social impairments was thus the response of 
social model theorists to the perceived risk that an analogy  between impairments and 
illness would legitimize the dominion of medical expertise and perpetuate socially 
disabling assumptions about normality.27 To be sure, social model theorists acknowledged 
the need to theorize about medical impairments, just not within a comprehensive social 
theory  of disability, and not in the confines of the social model. Many of its early 
advocates believed that including a theory of impairment in the social model could 
undermine the model’s political effectiveness.  As one of the model’s prominent theorists 
put it, “[t]he denial of impairment has not, in reality, been a denial at all.  Rather it has 
been a pragmatic attempt to identify and address issues that can be changed through 
 14
27 In using interchangeably the social model and the claims social movement for disability rights, I gloss 
over the complexities of the social movement itself. See Samuel Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of 
the Disability Rights Movement. 
15
collective action rather than medical or other professional treatment.”28  This pragmatic 
political awareness was more than an additional strategic layer to a self-standing 
normative argument; it pervaded the normative core of the social model and, with it, the 
core of the claims put forth by the movement. It helps in this context to recall that the 
project of transformation that social model theorists envisaged was comprehensive, not 
piecemeal.29  The wholesale shift from an individual to a social approach is premised on 
disconnecting disability  from illness: “The achievement of the disability  movement has 
been to break the link between our bodies and our social situation, and to focus on the 
real cause of disability, i.e. discrimination and prejudice. To mention biology, to admit 
pain, to confront our impairments, has been to risk the oppressors seizing on evidence 
that disability is ‘really’ about physical limitation after all.”30  The distrust of courts as 
reliable fora for deliberation distorted the arguments of the movement, shaped the claims 
of plaintiffs, and had the perverse effect of courts resorting to the medicalized approach 
as a consequence of their failure to understand the tenets of the social model. 
The distrust that judges can reason their way through the relationship between medical 
impairments and medical conditions, illness and disability and more broadly about body/
mind/nature/society led to an understanding of courts as arenas for political strategy 
where claimants’ success depends on engaging in the kind of instrumental rationality  that 
characterizes strategic, as opposed to communicative, actions. A claim is distorted when 
its strategic components trump its communicative components.31  Consider for instance 
the strategic components in Navas. As mentioned previously, that case involved the 
question whether disability includes illness so that discrimination on the basis of illness – 
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28. Oliver, Understanding,  at 41–42 (“We must not assume that models in general and the social model in 
particular can do everything: that it can explain disability in totality.  It is not a social theory of disability 
and it cannot do the work of social theory. . . .  An adequate social theory of disability must contain a theory 
of impairment . . . . So let’s develop a social model of impairment to stand alongside a social model of 
disability but let’s not pretend that either or both are social theory.”).
29 For the philosophical underpinning of such an approach, see Jay, Marxism and Totality (1986). 
 30.  See id. at 39 (citing M.  Shakespeare).   From this perspective, impairment and illness should be kept 
separate.  The latter requires medical treatment, impairments might not.  The confusion results from the 
colonizing tendency of the medical approach.
31 For the distinction between strategic and communicative, see Habermas. 
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or a medical condition – is or can be tantamount to discrimination based on the disability. 
The ECJ answered the question in the negative, holding that illness falls outside of 
disability  discrimination. However, it is not immediately  obvious why disability 
discrimination should not be expanded to protect any  decision made by an employer on 
the basis of a health condition of an employee (a condition of the body or mind). Since no 
antidiscrimination provision includes illness among suspect grounds, it is a viable 
question whether in situations of power asymmetry  that are subject to legal regulation, 
whether in the private spheres such has employment or in public spheres where the state 
is involved, decisions about the status of individuals should ever turn on a condition of 
their body and/or mind. 
The strategic interests of the social movement, concerned with its own self-identity, 
added complexity  to the issue. At one level, the Court’s negative answer to the question if 
disability  includes illness can be seen as consistent with the interests of the social 
movement. However unwelcome the narrow, medicalized definition itself might be, the 
ECJ’s refusal to accept illness as a suspect criterion, or as part of the suspect class of 
disability, fits the strategy of the social movement because it does not threaten to distort 
the movement’s self-identify.  The relation between self-understanding, on the one hand, 
and the status of belonging to a certain social category, on the other hand, is particularly 
significant in the case of persons with disabilities because of the wide array  of medical 
impairments that  triggers social discrimination.32 Yet social reform depends on effective 
political advocacy whose strength depends at least partly  on the shared consciousness of 
participants in the social movement. Unlike with other disadvantaged groups that 
struggled for recognition, where such commonality—on grounds of race, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc.—could be more or less taken for granted, the formation of a shared 
consciousness of persons with disabilities required that the protected class be carefully 
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 32.  See Scotch, Social Movement, at 163 (“‘disability’ as a unifying concept that includes people with a 
wide range of physical and mental impairments is by no means an obvious category.   Blind people, people 
with orthopedic impairments, and people with epilepsy may not inherently see themselves or be seen by 
others as occupying common ground.  Even greater divisions may exist between individuals with physical 
impairments and those with mental disabilities.   Thus another prerequisite for collective action may be the 
social construction and promulgation of an inclusive definition of disability.”).
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delineated. From this perspective, linking impairments and illness run the risk of 
expanding the ambits of the protected class, dilute the shared political identity of the class 
members, and delay, perhaps sine die, political emancipation.  From the perspective of 
the social movements, allowing persons who are ill to receive disability  protection would 
undermine the conditions for the development of a collective consciousness that could 
support effective political action.  This idea of a special class, a group, was central to the 
architecture of the social model.33  From within that model, the transition from the 
medical to the social approach brought with it a shift from an individual approach to a 
group perspective.  At the very core of the social model, at least in its early formulations, 
was the need for a “process of empowerment of disabled people as a group” by contrast 
to the individualized assessment of the medicalized approach.34  Implied in this shift  is 
the acceptance of a binary approach to disability (including a categorical conception of 
dependence/independence), and conversely, a rejection of the view that it is best to 
conceptualize disability along a continuum. It is thus apparent how this political strategy 
shaped the core claims of the social model, particularly  the lack of theorizing about 
medical impairments. In this light, the ECJ’s refusal to extend the Directive’s protection 
to cover Navas’s illness was correct. The social model provides counter-arguments to the 
position of the referring court to the effect  that “a worker should . . . be protected as soon 
as the sickness is established.”35
But the resilience of the medicalized approach is the effect of convergence between 
the social movement’s fears that only a strong social discrimination approach could create 
the shared political consciousness necessary for reform, on the one hand, and something 
else. That additional factor becomes visible when approaching the question of the 
definition of disability from the standpoint of those called to answer it. Courts have 
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 33.  As always in these situations, there is a risk of essentializing the traits that delimit the protected 
class.  See Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 191 (2006) (“the liberty 
paradigm [protects] the authentic self better than the equality paradigm. While it need not do so, the 
equality paradigm is prone to essentializing the identities it protects.”).
 34.  Oliver, Understanding, at 37. 
 35.  See Opinion of AG., Navas, 27.
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understandable concerns with administrability  of potentially sweeping disability statutes. 
According to this institutional self-understanding, they are actors entrusted with the 
interpretation and application of statutes in a clear, rational, and administrable fashion. 
Administrability, for instance, plays an important role in the concerns of the judiciary.36 If 
adjudication is understood as line-drawing and line-policing, then the task becomes to 
filter out abusive claims.37  This task requires drawing and enforcing the boundaries of 
the group to whom the law grants special entitlements.  How those boundaries are drawn 
will impact on the formation of the group’s political consciousness. That impact, 
however, is not likely  to be a concern of the judiciary.  The stakes in the definition of 
disability  are a function of its far-reaching implications for both courts and the social 
movement, albeit for different reasons.38 
I have thus far traced the staying power of rights to the double helix of strategic and 
communicative elements of right-claims. I have also argued, specifically  by reference to 
the disability example, that the judiciary’s institutional self-understanding explained its 
reaction to the strategic decision of the social movement to gloss over the need to 
theorize medical impairments from a social model perspective. The explanations for the 
resilience of the medicalized approach can be found at least  in part at the convergence of 
the strategizing of disability movement, on the one hand, and the self-understanding of 
courts, on the other hand. However, there is something unsatisfactory about ending the 
analysis at this point. There is a poverty of institutional analysis when it remains entirely 
confined to the description of strategic behavior. There is more to say on the topic of 
struggles for recognition, rights and courts – and one feels the need to move into 
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 36.  The dissenters in a landmark ADA case in the US noted the majority’s concern with “the tidal waves 
of lawsuits”36  that presumably would have followed from authorizing plaintiffs to bring claims despite the 
alleviating effects of measures that mitigate their impairment. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 508 (Stevens J., 
dissenting).
37 See the ECJ in Navas: “[t]here is nothing in Directive 2000/78 to suggest that workers are protected by 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability as soon as they develop any type of sickness,
 38.  Because of these high stakes, the definition of disability has become the battleground of different 
approaches See, Bagenstos, at 45 (“Passing judgment on the Supreme Court’s definition-of-disability 
decisions . .  . entails passing judgment on the strategies and ideals of disability movement activists 
themselves.”). 
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normative territory in order to say it. For instance, however understandable their 
institutional concerns might be, courts deciding disability claims nevertheless 
disappointed the expectations of both claimants and legislator. What exact duty did their 
actions fail to meet? The role of courts is not exhausted by strategic institutional 
considerations – there are other standards that courts of law must live up to. The next 
section takes the analysis in that direction by drawing on the new governance canon in 
articulating a richer normative critique.  
§3. Two conceptions of responsiveness: An excursus into constitutional theory 
This section identifies the conception of responsiveness – the “meta-value of social 
responsiveness”39  – at  the center of new governance’s conceptual framework for richer 
critique. Responsiveness-centered analysis makes that framework well-suited for such 
critical inquiries. At the same time, I aim to show that its exclusive focus on the dynamic 
of institutional arrangements makes that conception of responsiveness inherently 
unstable. Finally, I sketch out an alternative, more stable and normatively  robust 
conception of responsiveness that draws on the normative outlook of the form of 
government – constitutional democracy – in which institutional arrangements exist. 
 According to what Walker and de Burca call “the absorption, or merger, orientation” 
– and which they contrast to the “separation orientation” - new governance brings to law 
a “highly pragmatic and flexible approach to and modality of regulation, a method of 
ensuring maximum responsiveness and adaptability.”40 New governance thus offers ways 
for “democratizing” law, at least in the sense of making regulation sufficiently adaptive to 
the interests and demands of its subjects. As Sturm & Scott argue, “courts prompt new 
governance institutions to provide for full and fair participation by those affected by, and 
responsible for, new governance processes.”41  The themes of participation, flexibility, 
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39 Walker and de Burca, p. 17.
40 Id. 
41 Catalysts, 567. See also Katie Young’s article, ICON. 
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transparency and accountability  are central to the canon and can be interpreted as 
subsumed to the imperative of responsiveness. The same is true about the new 
governance’s emphasis on constant institutional experimentation. Experimentation is 
necessary  because institutions have an inherent tendency towards ossification, thus 
entrenching the interests of select social groups. Institutional experimentation is a form of 
radicalizing democracy by  enhancing the responsiveness of the institutional arrangements 
to the demands and interests of the members of a free community of equals. According to 
Unger’s idea of destabilization rights, each these members should have the tools to 
challenge and unsettle institutional arrangements that right-holders experience as no 
longer responsive to their legitimate needs. Destabilization rights are tools for individuals 
to reshape the social space. 
 The connection with democracy is vitally important. Democracy alone among all 
forms of government promises its subjects ownership over the social spaces they inhabit. 
As Thomas Pogge has put  it, there is a “moral imperative that political institutions should 
maximize and equalize citizens’ ability to shape the social context in which they live.”42 
Indeed, the members of a free community of equals can neither establish nor retain a 
connectedness with the political world if their claims fail to engage the institutions to 
which they are addressed. The normative availability of institutions – their 
responsiveness capacity  – is what keeps social spaces, and thus the conditions of 
collective self-government, open to all members of a free community of equals. As 
Hannah Arendt wrote, “whenever people come together, the world thrusts itself between 
them, and it  is in this in-between space that all human affairs are conducted.”43  Law 
shapes these in-between spaces. Unlike in totalitarian regimes, where institutions remain 
glacial – or worse, they retaliate – when faced with the demands of their subjects, a 
democratic state keeps the spaces between people and public institutions, and between 
people themselves, open to access, contestation, and re-imagination. In a constitutional 
democracy, the constitution establishes the structures and sets the conditions that allow 
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42 Thomas Pogge, Politics as Usual at 200 (2010) 
43 Hannah Arendt, Introduction into Politics in The Promise of Politics 106 (2005).
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people to access, challenge, and (re)make the spaces between themselves and their public 
institutions. 
        Anti-discrimination rights are destabilization rights. When courts decide disability 
cases by narrowing the meaning of disability, they confine the statute rationae persone by 
limiting the class of beneficiaries. There is a cumulative social effect to these decisions, 
which limit the reach and frequency of citizens’ challenges to the shared social space. 
They  reduce the situations when stakeholders can challenge, destabilize and re-shape the 
social spaces. This paradigmatic instance of unresponsiveness is only compounded by the 
opaque justifications that courts – and I’m referring here specifically  to the ECJ, though 
the same applies to the US courts- use to justify their decisions.  More than in its usual 
manner44, the ECJ’s Navas reasoning was opaque because the focus on definitional 
questions about the meaning of “disability” pulled judges in the direction of conceptual 
analysis – what some might know as “transcendental non-sense.”45  The medicalized 
approach could thrive in the fetid darkness of impenetrability. By contrast, one can 
imagine an alternative – the decisions of courts in Canada or Australia help  in that task – 
where disability  is interpreted broadly  and judges spend the superior quantum of their 
interpretative energy on the issue whether the action or inaction at issue amounts to 
discrimination. Note how the unresponsiveness in Navas is addressed to the demands of 
present (and future) claimants. But one can certainly enlarge the framework to include 
legislators.46  These narrow judicial interpretations have also been unresponsive to the 
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44 See generally Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 Virginia J. Int’l L. 
307 (2009). 
45 Felix Cohen, Transcendental nonsense and the Functional Approach, Columbia Law Review (1935). I 
should hasten to add that I do not believe there is anything inherently nonsensical about conceptual 
analysis.  
46 In fact, one can enlarge the framework even more. For instance, Jack Balkin has gestured in the direction 
of responsiveness in the formation of legitimacy judgments in his discussion of the role of social feedback 
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Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 485, 503 (2004). See 
also Robert Post, Forward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 
4 (2003) (defining constitutional culture as the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors and emphasizing the 
dialectical relationship between constitutional culture and constitutional law).
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legislators whose policies to promote the social model of disability these decisions 
undermined. Rather than act as catalysts, bringing together the different institutional 
actors and stakeholders, courts have acted in ways that alienated these myriad 
participants in the regulatory process.
 The conception of responsiveness presented in the new governance literature is 
essentially  procedural. Its essential outlook is well captured by Frank Michelman’s 
discussion of Robert Post’s Constitutional Domains. While Post’s work does not belong 
to the new governance literature, it  nevertheless shares some of the same conceptual 
territory. According to Michelman, the “responsive” theory of democracy assumes that 
“each individual who (cares to) exercises real if mediated self-rule through his or her 
respective contributions to collective processes. The agency of each is diluted but 
preserved in a stream of political results that  ‘respond’ like vector sums to each and every 
input vector.”47  Such concerns underlie new governance’s emphasis on access, 
participation, transparency and accountability. Whether or not resting on epistemic 
foundations – the new governance emphasis on disagreement and indeterminacy leaves 
that possibility  open -, responsiveness is understood as the reaction of public institutions 
– including courts, when all else fails – to the demands and needs of the members of the 
polity. Experimentation is necessary because democratic arrangements must adapt to 
societal interests.  
       In this understanding of “responsive democracy,” there can be no objective – in the 
sense of transcendental - criterion by which to assess the substantive performance of a 
society’s institutional arrangements. Responsiveness here is simply a matter of 
institutional reaction to stimuli, and thus depends on the aggregate of societal 
preferences.48 And yet, this is not where things rest. The new governance canon is shot 
through with fruitful and telling equivocations on this issue. The canon mentions “robust 
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47 Michelman, Must Constitutional Democracy Be “Responsive”?, Ethics vol. 107, 706 at 708 (1997). 
48 Michelman analogizes it with Dworkin’s conception of statistical democracy. See Dworkin, The Moral 
Reading of the Constitution (the Introduction). 
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proceduralization”49, which refers to courts’ capacity  to “structure an integral relationship 
between procedure and substance.”50 Similarly, the duty of courts to give reasons for their 
decisions is portrayed as part of “principled decision-making: transparency and 
accuracy.” At the same time, however, “reason-giving is not solely a procedural 
requirement; it  is a substantive requirement pertaining to the kind of justification which 
can legitimately  be put forward.”51  These are equivocations about the relationship 
between procedure and substance in the new governance theory. They lead us to 
articulate conceptions of responsiveness that are not completely procedural. But how 
should one conceptualize substantive aspects of “responsive” democracy? 
Responsiveness is best understood as referring to a posture of normative 
availability of public institutions towards their citizens and non-citizens who come within 
their jurisdiction. These institutions, including courts, have a duty  to respond to the 
claims of a pluralist citizenry  in ways that recognize and reinforce the social standing of 
each citizen claimant - present and future claimants - as free and equal. Institutions must 
give answers that the claimant and his/her representatives will find intelligible, that show 
appropriate respect to the claimant, and demonstrate thoughtful consideration of the 
meaning of the claim and the impact  of the institution’s response on the claimant and the 
political community as a whole. Responsiveness signals the recognition, respect, and 
consideration that institutions give to citizens, and that citizens give to one another. 
Judgments of legitimacy are, in part, judgments about the capacity for normative 
responsiveness of the political institutions.52
“Respond” is a euphemism. At issue here are exercises of political power that 
coerce subjects into compliance with norms which they can – and often do – reasonably 
challenge on substantive grounds of fairness, as they understand it. Indeed, pluralism puts 
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52 For an earlier, though different, account of “responsiveness,” see Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, 
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particular pressure on responsiveness, especially, the kind of self-perpetuating pluralism 
that, as Rawls defined it, is “the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the 
framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime.”53 These social 
circumstances challenge the terms of the interaction between public institutions and their 
subjects. The fact of pluralism widens the pool of perspectives on social and political life 
from which claims are drawn while at the same time deepening the need for justification 
of specific institutional responses in ways acceptable to a pluralist  citizenry. How can the 
free institutions of a constitutional democracy retain an appropriately high degree of 
responsiveness to the claims of a citizenry  that holds deep, reasonable yet incompatible, 
comprehensive doctrines of the good? While differently  worded, constant references to 
complexity, novelty, disagreement and uncertainty  show that new governance literature 
shares these pivotal concerns. 
It is a duty incumbent upon all public institutions to respond to the claims 
addressed to them in ways that recognize and reinforce the social standing of each citizen 
claimant as free and equal. The duty is met by reacting to claimants, and by  doing it in 
particular ways. While political theories offer a gamut of different interpretations of the 
specific content of the duty, at the very minimum, institutions must give claimants 
answers that they and their representatives will find intelligible, that  do not misinterpret 
the claim, that show appropriate respect to the claimant as a free and equal citizen, and 
demonstrate thoughtful consideration of the meaning of the claim and the impact of the 
institution’s response on the claimant and the political community as a whole. It is easy  to 
see why these requirements are particularly important in the case of responses by courts 
as public institutions. When citizens bring a claim to legal decision-makers, they  are in 
effect appealing to law to arbiter their relations with institutions that allegedly  have been 
unresponsive to their demands. An important social function of judicial remedies is to 
reopen the public space and eo ipso restore the fair terms of social cooperation and the 
conditions for self-government. Given the state’s claim to monopoly over the legitimate 
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use of violence, no other public institution can deliver the immediate satisfaction of a 
citizen’s particular need, should the institutions of the legal system also prove 
unresponsive.
This is not the place to attempt the taxonomy of unresponsiveness. Whatever its 
specific form (inaction, wrong action, refusal to recognize or misrecognition54), the 
“glaciality”55  or lack of an appropriate response of public institutions threatens to erode 
the legitimacy potential of a political order. Constitutional legitimacy  is partly  a function 
of the constitutional system’s high levels of responsiveness to citizens’ claims. Because 
institutional responsiveness to a citizen’s claim to recognition and/or action is a statement 
about that citizen’s social standing, judgments of legitimacy are, in part, judgments about 
normative responsiveness.
To understand the connection between responsiveness and legitimacy, in the 
particular context of adjudication, it helps to turn to the concept of a legal claim. For 
reasons of consistency, I pursue the analysis with respect to the constitutional form of 
legal claims. Constitutional claims represent citizens’ own interpretations of 
constitutional provisions (recall that in many European constitutions, and at the EU level, 
the prohibition on disability discrimination has constitutional status – or a functional 
equivalent) that aspire to official status upon endorsement from courts, as the institutions 
invested with the authority to interpret authoritatively  the meaning of the constitutional 
text.56   Drawing on Charles Taylor’s work on the social imaginary, we can identify the 
origin of constitutional claims in the claimant’s “constitutional imaginary.” Taylor refers 
to the social imaginary  as “a largely  unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our 
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whole situation... (,) an implicit map  of the social space.”57  He distinguishes social 
imaginary  from social theory, and writes that “for most of human history  and for most of 
social life, we function through the grasp we have of the common repertory, without 
benefit of theoretical overview. Humans operated with a social imaginary  well before 
they  ever got  in the business of theorizing about themselves.”58  By analogy, a 
constitutional imaginary can be understood as an implicit map of the constitutional space 
as it appears from an individual citizen’s perspective. It is an implicit map because 
citizens do not routinely  think of interpretations of freedom, equality, and dignity  as 
specifically constitutional interpretations. They  appear constitutional once they are 
reconstructed within the discourse that constitutional democracy reserves for political 
approaches to freedom and equality. 
Citizens’ constitutional/legal imaginaries do not fully overlap with constitutional 
law/legal system. Even if/when these imaginaries are not the immediate reflection of their 
citizens’ un-universalizable comprehensive conceptions of the good, they nevertheless are 
not subject to the limitations and constraints under which constitutional doctrine is 
generated. For instance, citizens do not share certain concerns with courts, such as the 
administrability of constitutional norms, nor are their imaginaries subject to constraints 
such as stare decisis. However, even if they do not perfectly overlap, in a constitutional 
democracy, the spheres of citizens’ constitutional imaginaries and constitutional law 
should be synchronized. The capacity  to access courts is in this sense an essential 
guarantee against  citizens’ political and social alienation; that is, a guarantee that the 
conditions of collective self-government are not beyond the reach of the members of that 
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free community  of equals.59 As Joel Feinberg wrote, “what is called ‘human dignity’ may 
be simply the recognizable capacity to assert claims.”60 
            The duty of responsiveness is a mechanism of synchronization between the 
subjects’ constitutional imaginaries and the legal system.61  Synchronization is, of course, 
a two-way street. As far as courts are concerned, they are under a duty to respond to the 
individual’s claim. Ex ante, the odds of a claim’s success are irrelevant to the attention 
the claim deserves from the institution to which it is addressed. Put differently, the 
institution has the same obligations of responsiveness to the claimant irres pective of the 
claim’s likelihood of success as gauged from past experience or from any other factor 
exogenous to the claim itself. At the other end, citizens’ constitutional imaginaries are not 
static either. Since responsiveness takes the form of reason-giving, a duty  of civility  is 
incumbent upon citizens, which requires them to engage in a process of reflective 
equilibrium where the claimant goes back and forth between the justification offered by 
the public institution in its response and the claimant’s original claim.62 
Return now to institutional responsiveness. A central lesson of the new 
governance literature is a constant reminder that access is a precondition of 
responsiveness. This is true in the case of all public institutions, especially in the law-
making process, but also when citizens approach courts, such as in the context of their 
claims for protection from disability discrimination. When courts can only answer claims 
that reach them, and whose meaning they understand. The fair value of responsiveness 
thus depends on the institutional mechanisms that secure the effective access of citizens 
 27
59 This synchronization is one aspect of what Jed Rubenfeld referred to as the “anti-totalitarian” principle in 
constitutional law. See Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time (Yale, 2001). The survival of certain elements of 
the constitutional imaginary might depend on his peers’ endorsement through institutional action. “What 
does not live in reality dies in the imagination” - Robert Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become 21 
(1996).
60  See Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, cited in Paul Ricoeur, The Course of 
Recognition 201 (2005).
61 I don’t mean to imply that only courts can interpret constitutions. Legislators also can. Cite BU 
symposium. 
62 I borrow the idea of the duty of civility from Rawls’s Political Liberalism. The process of reflective 
equilibrium on the part of the claimants is rooted in the duty of responsiveness. I present this argument in a 
less schematic fashion in Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government, ICON vol. 8 
(3), 2010. 
28
to the institutions before which they can press their demands about the specific terms of 
collective life. Yet, the space in which claims travel from their point of origin in the 
constitutional imaginary  to courts, and back, is marked by successive translation 
processes that may distort the meaning of the claim. Distortion effects can occur when 
citizens formulate their claims (including self-inflicted distortion effects of the type we 
encountered from the disability  rights movement), and when institutions translate and 
process them. 
Some distortion effects are inevitable. The effects caused by the necessity to 
translate claims into law’s formal categories are one example. The formal structure of 
legal categories explains the loss of original nuance and complexity; translation into legal 
“code” is seldom without residue. As Weber explained this process, “the expectations of 
parties will often be disappointed by the results of a strictly professional legal logic”:
“Such disappointments are inevitable...where the facts of life are juridically 
‘constructed’ in order to make them fit  the abstract propositions of law and in 
accordance with the maxim that  nothing can exist in the realm of law unless it 
can be ‘conceived’ by the jurist in conformity with those ‘principles’ which are 
revealed to him by juristic science.... To a large extent  such conflicts are the 
inevitable consequence of the incompatibility that  exists between the intrinsic 
necessities of logically consistent formal legal thinking and the fact that the 
legally relevant  agreements and activities of private parties are aimed at 
economic results and oriented towards economically determined expectations... 
a ‘lawyers’ law’ has never been and will never be brought  into conformity with 
lay expectations unless it totally renounce that formal character which is 
immanent in it.”63
Not all distortion effects are inevitable. For instance, there is nothing inevitable in 
decisions reflecting the biases of the decision-makers.64 Finally, there are effects that 
might or might not be distortive, depending on how and when they are deployed. The 
doctrine of stare decisis is generally responsive to both present and future claimants, yet 
it could also be used in ways that produce distortion effects. 
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Because of these different types of distortion effects, it  is important not to tie the 
legitimacy  of a constitutional system – its “respect-worthiness”65  – to an assessment of 
the mere existence of such distortion mechanisms (even when they were partly self-
inflicted, as in the case of disability rights). Rather, legitimacy is a function of how 
effectively a constitutional system has developed mechanisms for de-programming 
distortions from its doctrines and discourse or for minimizing their impact, when the 
cause of distortion cannot be eradicated. Determinations about legitimacy are judgments 
of degree that can fine-tune to the existence and efficiency of such responsiveness 
mechanisms. While the dynamic of responsiveness is influenced by legal culture and 
historical development, some features of modern constitutional systems can be 
normatively reconstructed as part of a strategy  for self-correction against distortion 
effects. 
We see now why, in the case of disability  rights, the duty of responsiveness that 
courts owed to the claimants required them to correct for the self-inflicted distortion 
effects resulting in their plaintiffs’ several and the social movement’s collective failure to 
offer a social model theory of medical impairments for use in the judicial interpretation of 
the definition of disability. The duty  of judicial responsiveness in a constitutional 
democracy  requires judges to anticipate and counter situations when the “input vectors” 
have been subject to distortion effects. 
Conclusion: The not-so-strange alchemy of new governance and “old government”66 
I have argued above that  the substantive aspects of a theory of responsiveness can be 
found in the normative theory of the form of government – constitutional democracy  - 
whose exercise of power these institutions structure and channel. The conception of 
responsiveness becomes more stable and robust when placed within a larger normative 
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conception of constitutional democracy. The resulting combination of new governance 
and “old government” is a reminder that, however important courts’ role as arbiters of 
interaction and information-sharing might be, law remains – essentially though by no 
means exclusively - a coercive practice. Approaching responsiveness in this new light 
also helps to clarify  three ambiguities that unnecessarily  erode the normative power of 
new governance. The first is the conception of flexibility (mistakenly equating 
responsiveness with flexibility, thus failing fully to theorize to whom the duty of 
responsiveness is owed); the second is the conception of transparency  (mistakenly 
equating responsiveness with transparency, thus failing to capture the justificatory depth 
of the duty to give reasons) and finally the conception of catalysis (mistakenly equating 
responsiveness with catalysis, thus downplaying the essentially violent and coercive 
dimension of state – including judicial – power). 
 This analysis is a helps to see in a new light some of the central insights of new 
governance. However innovative and original contemporary regulatory phenomena might 
be, these phenomena still involve perennial questions about violence, power, dignity and 
self-government that have always been the concern of political theory. 
***
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